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ACADEMIC PERSPECTIVES ON SALT
Maryland’s Digital Tax and the ITFA’s Catch-22
by Darien Shanske, Christopher Moran, and David Gamage
Introduction
The Internet Tax Freedom Act (ITFA),1 enacted 
as a temporary measure in 1998, then extended 
eight times as a temporary provision, and finally 
made permanent in 2016, prevents states and 
localities from taxing internet access or imposing 
“multiple or discriminatory” taxes on electronic 
commerce. The pandemic has accelerated the 
already rapid growth of the digital economy and 
digital advertising, and it stands to reason that 
state revenue systems should adapt to this shift.
One type of shift is to include digital goods 
and services within a state’s sales tax base, and 
another is to design new taxes that reflect the new 
economy. Maryland recently adopted both kinds 
of changes. The expansion of its sales tax to digital 
goods has been seen as good policy that raises no 
federal constitutional issues. By contrast, 
Maryland’s adoption of a new tax structure — a 
new tax on digital advertising — has attracted 
intense criticism and a lawsuit.
The strongest legal claim against Maryland’s 
new tax is a preemption argument under the 
ITFA, which we will address here. In short, we 
will argue that the preemption argument based on 
the ITFA’s prohibition on levying so-called 
discriminatory taxes on electronic commerce is 
too facile; there is a strong argument on the other 
side. Further, if there are two reasonable 
interpretations of the ITFA’s scope, the narrower 
interpretation that would not preempt the 
Maryland law is supported by a battery of 
constitutional canons. Given the novelty of the 
issue, we are not confident that the Maryland tax 
will eventually be upheld on the merits. However, 
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In this installment of Academic Perspectives 
on SALT, the authors examine whether state-
level taxes on digital advertising — like 
Maryland’s new tax — are barred by the 
Internet Tax Freedom Act and discuss how the 
act’s prohibition against “discriminatory” taxes 
on electronic commerce should be construed 
narrowly.
1
P. L. 105-277, Tit. XI, 112 Stat. 2681-719 (1998), as amended by P.L.
107-75, section 2, 115 Stat. 703 (2001); P.L. 108-435, sections 2-6A, 118 Stat. 
2615-2618 (2004); P.L. 110-108, sections 2-6, 121 Stat. 1024-1026 (2007); P.L.
113-235, Tit. VI, section 624, 128 Stat. 2377 (2014); P.L. 114-125, Tit. IX, 
section 922, 130 Stat. 281 (2016) (codified at 47 U.S.C. section 151 note).
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we can say with confidence that this is a much 
harder case than many have suggested.
Short Background of the ITFA
The ITFA prohibits states and localities from 
levying “taxes on Internet access, or multiple or 
discriminatory taxes on electronic commerce.”2 
ITFA proponents initially justified the 
moratorium as a means of protecting the growth 
of the nascent internet economy and allowing 
states and localities to develop uniform, 
coordinated definitions regarding taxes on 
internet access and electronic commerce, rather 
than a permanent ban.3 Over time, those same 
supporters justified the ban as necessary to 
encourage household adoption of internet access.4 
Proponents expressed concern that allowing 
states and localities to tax internet access would 
hinder efforts to close the gap in the rates at which 
high- and low-income households access the 
internet, often referred to as the “digital divide.”5 
At the origin of the ITFA, approximately 30 
percent of the U.S. population accessed the 
internet.6 Internet sales in 1997 (the year before 
enactment of the ITFA) were estimated to be $8 
billion.7 Today, nearly 90 percent of the U.S. 
population has access to the internet, and online 
sales were estimated at more than $860 billion.8 
Digital advertising, a $900 million market in 1997,9 
is projected to exceed $150 billion in 2021.10
Maryland’s Tax on Digital Advertising
Maryland’s tax applies to annual gross 
revenue derived from digital advertising in the 
state.11 Only taxpayers with at least $1 million of 
annual gross revenue derived from digital 
advertising services in Maryland and $100 million 
of global annual gross revenue are subject to the 
tax.12 The tax is levied at scaled rates starting at 2.5 
percent for taxpayers with global annual gross 
revenues of $100 million through $1 billion and 
rising to 10 percent for taxpayers with global 
annual gross revenues exceeding $15 billion.13 
Maryland does not levy sales tax or gross receipts 
tax on the sale of print advertising services.14
The ITFA and Maryland’s Tax
The plaintiffs make two arguments based on 
the ITFA and many more based on the U.S. 
Constitution. We will focus here on what we take 
to be the plaintiffs’ strongest claim:
The Act imposes a charge on digital 
advertising delivered over the internet 
without applying a similar charge to non-
digital advertising. Thus, the Act’s charge 
is unlawfully “discriminatory” within the 
meaning of ITFA.15
All definitions of discrimination in the law 
require that a tax be imposed on internet activities 
but not “similar property, goods, services, or 
information accomplished through other 
2
47 U.S.C. section 151, note section 1101(a)(1), (2).
3
H.R. Rep. No. 105-808, at 12 (1998) (referring to the three-year 
moratorium as a “time out” and calling for the commission created in 
the ITFA to generate legislative proposals addressing taxation of the 
internet); S. Rep. No. 105276, at 4-5 (1998) (“fair and administrable rules 
for taxing and regulating the use of the Internet . . . should be 
developed”); see also 143 Cong. Rec. S2282-83 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 1997), 
statement of Sen. Ron Wyden, D-Ore.: “The purpose of the bill I am 
introducing today . . . is to allow everyone to stand back and take a deep 
breath. It says let’s suspend this crazy tax quilting bee so that everyone 
can come together in a rational way to figure out what policy makes the 
most sense.” The internet access provider members of the resulting 
Advisory Commission on Electronic Commerce did not offer any 
proposals, and instead voted to recommend a permanent ban on 
taxation of internet access.
4
A 2006 Government Accountability Office study found no evidence 
that state and local taxes had a significant impact on household internet 
access. See GAO, “Broadband Deployment Is Extensive Throughout the 
United States, but It Is Difficult to Assess the Extent of Deployment Gaps 
in Rural Areas,” GAO-06-426, at 21-22, 31-32, and Appendix III (May 
2006). Donald Bruce, John Deskins, and William F. Fox, “Has Internet 
Access Taxation Affected Internet Use?” 32(2) Pub. Fin. Rev. 131, 145 
(2004).
5
See Jeffrey M. Stupak, “The Internet Tax Freedom Act: In Brief,” 
Congressional Research Service, Report for Congress R43772 (Oct. 5, 
2015).
6
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, “Internet Users for the United 
States” (last updated Dec. 17, 2020).
7
Wendy R. Liebowitz, “Taxman Has Interest in Internet Biz,” Nat’l L. 
J. (Mar. 16, 1998).
8
Fareeha Ali, “U.S. E-Commerce Grows 44.0% in 2020,” Digital 
Commerce 360, Jan. 29, 2021.
9
Interactive Advertising Bureau, “Internet Advertising Sees 
Breakthrough Year in 1997,” Apr. 6, 1998.
10
Statista, “Digital Advertising — United States.”
11
Md. Code Ann. Tax-Gen. section 7.5-102(a).
12
Md. Code Ann. Tax-Gen. section 7.5-201.
13
Md. Code Ann. Tax-Gen. section 7.5-103.
14
Md. Regs. Code section 03.06.01.38(A)(1). Baltimore City levies an 
excise tax on off-site billboard advertising. This tax, 90 percent of which 
was borne by Clear Channel, was recently upheld by the Maryland 
Court of Appeals against a First Amendment challenge. See Clear Channel 
Outdoor Inc. v. Director, Department of Finance of Baltimore City No. 9, 
September Term 2020 (Mar. 15, 2021).
15
Chamber of Commerce v. Franchot, No. 1:21-cv-410, complaint para. 76 
(D. Md. 2021).
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means.”16 And, to be sure, the Maryland tax is 
imposed on digital advertising and not, say, 
advertising in a newspaper. So end of story?
We think not. One might reasonably conclude 
that digital advertising is very different from 
regular print advertising and that the courts 
should — and surely sometimes do — look 
beyond mere labels. And one need only look at 
the beginning of the complaint to see how 
different digital advertising is from print 
advertising. The plaintiffs argue that the digital 
services tax is not a tax at all, but a penalty levied 
to control the special externalities caused by 
technology companies that earn billions of dollars 
through digital advertising. In particular, the 
argument goes, the targeted nature of these ads 
ties earning revenue to giving more of what a 
perceived consumer wants — often in ways that 
are pernicious to public discourse.17 A static 
advertisement in the local paper is seen by 
everyone and so must be careful, but an ad 
targeted to true believers need not be, and indeed 
will generate more views the more it stokes their 
prejudices.
It is beyond the scope of this article to fully 
evaluate these plausible claims as to the 
difference between digital and print ads,18 but the 
point is that the plaintiffs think that arguing that 
digital ads cause a distinct harm to be 
sufficiently plausible such that they are asking 
the court to treat Maryland’s tax as not a tax at all 
for purposes of the Tax Injunction Act.19 And 
state courts have endorsed similar reasoning in 
upholding state tax laws against an ITFA 
challenge. In Labell,20 an Illinois appellate court 
ruled that Chicago’s “Netflix tax” on video 
streaming services was not a discriminatory tax 
because there were no comparable services that 
did not involve electronic commerce. In Gartner,21 
the taxpayer argued that levying retail sales tax 
on subscriptions to its online research library 
constituted a discriminatory tax under the ITFA 
because the retail sales tax did not apply to 
research reports delivered by mail or CD. The 
Washington Court of Appeals rejected this 
argument, stating that selling access to an online 
research library is distinguishable from 
delivering research content in hard copy or via 
email because the library access involves 
software applications.22
The plaintiffs undoubtedly have responses, 
though we do think on balance that the stronger 
argument is that the plain meaning of the ITFA 
does not preempt Maryland’s tax. Our primary 
point here is to illustrate that there is an 
interaction between the statutory argument and 
constitutional concerns that have been raised 
about the ITFA.
Let’s suppose that the maximalist reading of 
the plaintiffs is the better one. What then? 
Presumably just avoiding the word 
“advertising” will not save a state tax, but any 
state tax on internet activity with a plausible 
non-digital analogue that is taxed not at all or 
differently or less would be preempted.
In short, we think that if the ITFA’s 
prohibition on discriminatory taxes is 
interpreted so broadly that it threatens to 
preempt states’ authority to tax a large and 
growing area of commerce, then the ITFA is itself 
16
47 U.S.C. section 151, note section 1105(2)(A)(i), (ii), (iii).
17
This particular argument in favor of a tax on digital advertising was 
made particularly forcefully by economist Paul Roemer. See Roemer, “A 
Tax That Could Fix Big Tech,” The New York Times, May 6, 2019. As the 
complaint notes, Romer testified in favor of the Maryland bill. See 
Complaint para. 40. Note that there are other rationales to consider 
digital taxes. For an argument that such taxes are a kind of consumption 
tax, see Young Ran (Christine) Kim, “Digital Services Tax: A Cross-
Border Variation of the Consumption Tax Debate,” 72 Alabama Law Rev. 
131 (2020). For a tax that relies more on an income tax rationale, see Omri 
Y. Marian, “Taxing Data” (Feb. 26, 2021).
18
On the one hand, there are Supreme Court cases that interpret the 
need for similarly situated comparators narrowly for purposes of the 
dormant commerce clause — see, e.g., United Haulers Association v. 
Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Management Authority, 550 U.S. 330 (2007). 
But there are also cases that arguably interpret the need for similarly 
situated comparators more broadly. See Alabama Department of Revenue v. 
CSX Transportation Inc., 575 U.S. 21, 28 (2015). Note that even CSX is 
hardly unambiguously good news for preemption proponents because it 
found that motor carriers were a fair comparator with railroads. As we 
explained, it is not clear that this would be an accurate description of the 
relationship between digital ads and print ads. Andrew D. Appleby 
makes a similar point about the potentially important difference 
between print and digital ads, though admittedly he is more skeptical of 
the Maryland law on other grounds. Appleby, “Subnational Digital 
Services Taxation,” 81 Maryland Law Rev. (Mar. 23, 2021).
19
And for the record, we do not think this is a good argument. At 
most, all that the evidence adduced by the plaintiff shows is that this is a 
Pigouvian tax — that is, a tax on a negative externality. If the plaintiffs 
are right, then they can also enjoin, say, tobacco taxes.
20
Labell v. City of Chicago, 147 N.E.3d 732 (2019), petition for leave to 
appeal denied, 144 N.E.3d 1175 (Ill. 2020).
21
Gartner Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 455 P.3d 1179 (Wash. 2020).
22
Id. at 1192.
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constitutionally suspect. Commentators now 
point to Murphy v. NCAA23 as possibly 
endangering the ITFA,24 but before we get to that 
difficult case, we should review the state of the 
law before Murphy.
State Taxing Power and the Presumption 
Against Preemption
There is a strong argument — associated 
with Michael T. Fatale — that Congress’s power 
under the commerce clause to preempt state 
taxing authority is much more limited than is 
commonly supposed because those limitations 
on the state taxing power are not sufficiently 
related to interstate commerce.25 Two of us have 
argued that this interpretation is too limiting, 
and that the better analysis is that Congress can 
limit state power over a much wider area, but not 
in a manner that would go too far.26
There has been little need to decipher the 
right analytic rubric because congressional 
preemption of state taxing power has to date 
been relatively rare and narrow.27 Further, there 
is a presumption against preemption that the 
U.S. Supreme Court seems to apply with 
particular rigor in connection with the state 
taxing power.28 The Court applied this 
presumption in connection with P.L. 86-272, the 
largest congressional intrusion into state taxing 
power,29 and the lower courts have followed its 
lead.30 At least one lower court applied this 
presumption to the ITFA to limit the scope of the 
term “discriminatory.”31
Thus, even before Murphy, there would be 
good reason for courts to put a thumb on the scale 
of interpretations that narrowly construe 
congressional preemption of state taxing 
authority.
Murphy and the Anti-Commandeering Doctrine
Almost immediately after it was issued, 
commentators noted that the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Murphy v. NCAA32 seemed to imply 
that much of Congress’s preemption of state law 
— including state tax laws — was itself 
unconstitutional.33 Murphy expands on the 
Court’s two principal cases analyzing the anti-
commandeering doctrine, New York34 and Printz.35 
New York and Printz conclude that the anti-
commandeering principle of the 10th 
Amendment prohibits the federal government 
from “commandeering” a state legislature or its 
executive officials in service of a federal 
regulatory program.
In contrast to New York and Printz, Murphy 
did not involve a federal statute requiring the 
states to take affirmative action; the federal statute 
merely forbade states from taking specific action. 
New Jersey repealed provisions of its laws 
prohibiting sports gambling, a direct challenge to 
a provision under the Professional and Amateur 
Sports Protection Act (PASPA) that made it 
“unlawful” for a state to authorize sports betting. 
The Supreme Court concluded that PASPA’s 
23
138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018).
24
See, e.g., Daniel Hemel, “Justice Alito, State Tax Hero?” Medium, 
May 15, 2018.
25
Michael T. Fatale, “Common Sense: Implicit Constitutional 
Limitations on Congressional Preemptions of State Tax,” 2012 Mich. St. 
L. Rev. 41 (2012).
26
David Gamage and Darien Shanske, “The Federal Government’s 
Power to Restrict State Taxation,” State Tax Notes, Aug. 15, 2016, p. 547.
27
For example, federal legislation sets uniform nationwide sourcing 
rules for state and local taxation of wireless services. See the Mobile 
Telecommunications Sourcing Act, P.L. 106-252, section 116, 114 Stat. 626 
(2000). Federal legislation also prohibits a state from taxing the 
retirement income of an individual who is not a resident or domiciliary 
of the state. See P.L. 104-95, 4 U.S.C. section 114. The 1975 amendments to 
the Securities Act limit states’ power to levy stock transfer taxes. See P.L. 
94-29, 15 U.S.C. section 78bb(d), 89 Stat. 97 (1975).
28
See, e.g., Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) 
(“We start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the 
States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the 
clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”). See also California State Board 
of Equalization v. Sierra Summit Inc., 490 U.S. 844, 851-852 (1989) 
(“Although Congress can confer an immunity from state taxation, we 
have stated that [a] court must proceed carefully when asked to 
recognize an exemption from state taxation that Congress has not 
clearly expressed. . . .”) (internal citations and quotation marks 
omitted); see also Florida Department of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias 
Inc., 554 U.S. 33, 48, 50 (2008) (following Sierra Summit). For further 
discussion, see Shanske, “States Can and Should Respond Strategically 
to Federal Tax Law,” 45 Ohio N. L. Rev. 543 (2019).
29
Heublein Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Commission, 409 U.S. 275, 281-82 
(1972).
30
See, e.g., Disney Enterprises Inc. v. Tax Appeals Tribunal of State, 10 
N.Y.3d 392, 403, 888 N.E.2d 1029, 1036 (2008) (“We begin our reading of 
Public Law 86-272 with the presumption that Congress does not intend 
to supplant state law.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
31
See Gartner, 455 P.3d at 1179.
32
Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1461.
33
See Hemel, supra note 24.
34
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
35
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
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prohibition on state authorization of sports 
gambling violated the anti-commandeering 
principle.36 The Court stated that the commerce 
clause “confers upon Congress the power to 
regulate individuals, not states.”37 It further 
elaborated that the anticommandeering 
principle prohibits Congress from issuing 
“direct orders” to state legislatures.38 A 
congressional prohibition on state-authorized 
sports gambling “unequivocally dictates what a 
state legislature may and may not do,” and is 
thus an unconstitutional “direct order” to a state 
legislature.39
Though it seems from the passages and 
reasoning cited above that Murphy would 
undermine much congressional preemption, 
including of state taxation, that is generally 
thought not to be the case.40 Not only did the 
Court’s decision offer examples of acceptable 
preemption,41 but all the justices in Wayfair — 
decided five weeks later in the same term — 
thought Congress could (and should) preempt the 
states and impose uniform rules as to use tax 
collection. Somehow, according to Murphy, 
Congress can regulate individuals but not states. 
But it is unclear to us — and to many — how to 
apply this distinction when Congress gives an 
individual a right not to be regulated by a state, 
which seems substantively hard to disentangle 
from an order to a state legislature not to regulate 
the individual.
Murphy’s opacity — and potential 
importance — has unsurprisingly spurred a lot 
of commentary as scholars try to decipher how 
Murphy should apply going forward. We can’t go 
through all the possible interpretations, but 
Murphy certainly cannot somehow increase the 
federal government’s power to preempt state 
taxes. Hence we started with our baseline 
understanding that federal preemption statutes 
are to be interpreted narrowly. As to Murphy, we 
would highlight the analysis of Dean Vikram 
Amar in particular. Amar argues that Murphy is 
best read as imposing a clarity requirement to 
conditional preemption statutes. Note that the 
ITFA, unlike PASPA, is not a conditional 
preemption statute, and so arguably Murphy 
then has no implication at all to our case. But it 
might, as Amar explains:
Perhaps requiring Congress to express its 
intent to preempt in unmistakable terms, 
and also to define the scope of preemption 
clearly, would make sense for preemption 
settings more generally. But it would be a 
rational first step for the Court to take to 
harmonize conditional spending and 
conditional preemption by requiring 
particular clarity in both settings, where 
the applicability of federal law will 
depend on legislative choices states are 
being encouraged — indeed invited — to 
make.42
Given the importance of state revenue 
functions, we think reading Murphy to add a 
requirement “to define the scope of preemption 
clearly” is particularly apt. Thus, returning to the 
reading of the ITFA apparently favored by the 
plaintiffs, there are now (at least) three 
background constitutional principles that render 
it problematic. First, there is a presumption 
against interpreting preemption statutes — 
especially those relating to state taxes — broadly. 
Second, if the ITFA does indeed preempt a broad 
36








For an example of a smart commentator asserting the consensus 
but not working out our particular hard question, see Edward Hartnett, 
“Distinguishing Permissible Preemption From Unconstitutional 
Commandeering,” 96 Notre Dame L. Rev. 351, 376 (2020): “Sure, Congress 
lacks the power to simply negate a state tax. But it continues to have the 
power to regulate interstate commerce. And as part of the power to 
regulate interstate commerce, it can give private parties a right to engage 
in certain kinds of interstate commerce free from state regulation or 
taxation.”
So the federal government cannot “simply” preempt a state tax but 
could preempt a tax if Congress gave a private party the right not to be 
taxed, but then can the federal government give a corporation the right 
to engage in commerce without state corporate taxation? That would be 
to negate a tax, and yet this would be to regulate interstate taxation by 
giving a private party a right.
41
Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1480.
42
Vikram David Amar, “‘Clarifying’ Murphy’s Law: Did Something 
Go Wrong in Reconciling Commandeering and Conditional Preemption 
Doctrines?” 2018 Sup. Ct. Rev. 299, 319-320 (2018).
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— and vague — area of state taxation, then for 
that reason the ITFA is vulnerable to challenge 
based on Amar’s reading of Murphy.43 Third, and 
precisely because the second issue is so difficult, 
the canon of constitutional avoidance indicates 
that a court should not interpret the ITFA in a 
manner that could raise these difficult 
constitutional questions.
Conclusion
The large and growing digital economy does 
not function the same as the non-digital 
economy. The Constitution should not prevent 
states from imposing reasonable taxes on the 
digital economy. The ITFA not only preempts 
taxes on internet access, but also preempts states 
if they tax similar transactions more heavily if 
they are conducted over the internet. The classic 
example would be taxing a purchase of shoes 
more heavily over the internet than in a brick-
and-mortar store. We think it is quite reasonable 
for the ITFA to do these two substantial things 
and not much more. If the ITFA instead reaches 
as far as the plaintiffs claim in the Maryland case, 
then it represents a dramatic and uncertain 
contraction of state taxing authority. There is 
substantial doubt whether Congress could 
achieve this result even if it clearly expressed its 
intent to, but we don’t think Congress did so and, 
thus, we think it did not. 
43
One of us has argued that one can read Murphy as objecting to 
Congress preempting too much with too little justification, a kind of 
proportionality analysis. See Shanske, “Proportionality as Hidden (But 
Emerging?) Touchstone of American Federalism: Reflections on the 
Wayfair Decision,” 22 Chapman L. Rev. 73 (2019). This reading has an 
upshot similar to Amar’s as to the ITFA: The broader the sweep of the 
statute, the greater its constitutional vulnerability.
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